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Introduction
As is well known, the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars of the late 18 th and early 19 th centuries were not just unusually lengthy and bloody, but involved widespread economic warfare as well. As early as 1793, when war broke out between Britain and France, France The Continental Blockade is the best-known example of economic warfare during this period, but it was not the only one. 1 Three other examples deserve special attention. First, Britain responded to Napoleon's blockade with a counter-blockade of the European continent, issuing a series of 'Orders in Council' beginning in Novermber 1807. As a result of these, neutrals were seized if they attempted to sail directly to an enemy port, without putting in at a British port first. The Continent was not just in a state of self-imposed blockade, but was facing an externally imposed blockade as well.
Second, these Franco-British manoeuvres would have serious implications for neutral powers, and not just within Europe, where countries such as Sweden and Denmark found themselves caught up in the dispute despite their desire to remain aloof from it. In particular, the young United States now found itself involved as well. Napoleon responded to the British Orders in Council by declaring that neutral ships putting into British ports would be seized by the French authorities. The upshot was that American merchants, who as neutrals had for years been carrying out a lucrative carrying trade between French colonies and France itself, now found themselves in a position whereby if they continued to try to do so, then no matter what they did they would be seized by either the British or the French. Thomas Jefferson responded with an Embargo Act in December 1807, which closed American ports to foreign ships and forbade American ships to leave port. As both Frankel (1982) Before doing so, I need to establish that these embargos and blockades had at least some effect on trade and welfare. After all, there is a venerable tradition which holds that such economic warfare was relatively ineffective, as a result of smuggling, and corrupt officials turning a blind eye to enemy goods being imported into their jurisdictions. Such is the position, for example, of Eli Heckscher (1964 [1922 ), as well as of some contemporary observers. On the other hand, François Crouzet (1987) argues that the Continental Blockade did cause hardship within British manufacturing during those periods when it was effectively applied, which according to Crouzet consisted of the periods between the middle of 1807 and the middle of 1808, and again between the spring of 1810 and the disastrous winter of 1812.
In a separate, widely cited article, Crouzet (1964) has argued strongly that the British and French blockades had important effects on the structure of Continental industry; while as previously mentioned both Frankel (1982) In this paper, I concentrate on the impact of these blockades and embargos, between the years 1807 and 1814, on three of the major protagonists: Britain, France and the United
States. I follow Frankel in using prices as my measure of trade disruption, and I also follow his lead in trying to assess the relative impact of these trade disputes on the different protagonists involved. I go one step further, however, by following Irwin's (forthcoming) attempt to quantify the welfare cost of trade disruption during the period. In particular, I want to take seriously the notion that the welfare costs of a terms of trade deterioration will depend not just on the size of the terms of trade shock, but on the extent to which the country concerned is exposed to international trade. I also want to show how estimates of welfare loss depend critically on the assumptions made about elasticities of substitution in both consumption and production: obviously, the greater the substitution possibilities in an economy, the more the economy will be able to adjust to an adverse terms of trade shock, and the lower will be the ultimate welfare costs of the shock.
In its emphasis on trade disruption and welfare costs, this paper is closely related to a more technical literature on the impact of war on trade. This literature, of which Glick and Taylor (2005) is the most recent example, typically uses the volume of trade as the dependent variable, and employs gravity models to see how wars affected it. Glick and Taylor go further, by using separately generated (by Frankel and Romer 1999) country by country, rather than using coefficients which are common across a group of countries. As will be seen, this is an important difference, since not all countries were the same, and war affected their trade, and welfare, in very different ways.
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The plan of the paper is as follows. I first review some of the price evidence which indicates clearly that embargos and blockades had an important trade-disrupting impact between 1807 and 1814, contrary to Heckscher's assertions. I then outline a simple economic model which can be used to calculate welfare losses for Britain, France and the United States, and show how these losses depend on the assumptions made about substitution elasticities.
While the estimates of absolute losses will turn out to depend heavily on these elasticities, it turns out that it is possible to reach some unambiguous conclusions regarding the relative welfare losses of the three countries concerned.
Relative price evidence
Although this paper will, as stated, rely on price evidence rather than quantity French and American imports were down by slightly more than 50% during 1807-14, US exports were down by slightly more than a third, and British trade volumes were affected only marginally, and in a statistically insignificant way (O'Rourke forthcoming).
What about the price evidence? The clearest evidence that international markets were being disrupted during the war would of course be information on international price gaps for particular commodities. There does exist some scattered evidence of this kind, and all of it suggests that the blockades and embargoes of the period were indeed effective. For example, Frankel (1982, pp. 307-8) finds that while Liverpool cotton prices were just 27.5% higher than Charleston prices during 1807, the price gap was no less than 293% during the final two months of Jefferson's Embargo. Similarly, it cost between 30 and 50 shillings to ship a quarter of wheat from the Baltic to Britain during 1810, as compared with 4s/6d during 1837 (Hueckel 1973, p. 369) . However, such evidence remains fairly scarce: it is easier to get systematic evidence on the behaviour of relative import prices within individual countries.
Moreover, showing that an international price gap opened up during the conflict says nothing about which country bore the associated cost: in general, this will depend on elasticities of supply and demand. Country-specific relative price evidence, on the other hand, can allow us to see where the embargos bit the most.
A companion piece to this paper, O'Rourke (forthcoming), explores the behaviour of a wide range of relative commodity prices during the blockades in several countries. Table 1 reproduces some of the main results for the countries of concern in this paper: Britain; countries which were part of the Continental Blockade; and the United States. The table confines itself to data on relative prices for comparable commodities across countries; in each case, it gives the percentage amount by which relative import prices exceeded their long run (quadratic) trend level during the years 1807-1814 inclusive. Of course, if relative import prices increased during these blockade years, that might not be solely as a result of 4 The figure helps explain why the average increase in relative raw cotton prices between 1807 and 1814 was small in Britain: there, the relative raw cotton price seems to have trended continuously downwards, and the spikes during the Embargo and war of 1812 were small when set against this overall trend. In the US case, by contrast, 1807-14 stands out far more sharply as a period of increased relative textile prices. 8 international commodity market disintegration; in particular cases it might simply reflect the vagaries of supply and demand. However, if the relative price of a particular commodity were to rise in countries which imported it, and to fall in countries exporting it, then it would be much more difficult to argue that rising barriers to trade had nothing to do with these price developments. Figure 2 shows that precisely this occurred in the case of the relative wheat/textile price in Britain and France. In Britain, which was a food-importer, the relative price of wheat rose, by an average of 41% over the period 1807-14 (Table 1 , Panel A), while in France the relative price of textiles rose, by an average of 20% over the period as a whole. Similarly, while the price of raw cotton relative to textiles rose in Europe, which imported raw cotton (by 79% in France, 31% in Holland, and 59% in Germany: Table 1 Table 1 suggest that the intra-European terms of trade turned against Britain by more than they did against France. However, when it came to the relative prices of goods produced outside Europe -not just spices such as pepper, but essential inputs into manufacturing as raw cotton, or sugar -then the picture is very different. Relative to the price of wheat (which as we have seen was increasing in Britain), pepper, raw cotton and sugar became cheaper in Britain, but significantly more expensive in France, Holland and Germany. Relative to the price of textiles (which was falling in relative terms in Britain), the price of such overseas imports rose by between 5% and 37% in Britain, but by between 79% and 126% in France, by between 31% and 215% in Holland, and between 59% and 130% in Germany. The European Continent was able to produce more textiles via import substitution when British supplies were cut off; it was not able to produce more pepper or raw cotton. Famously, the Blockades did give a boost to Continental sugar beet production; the first sugar beet factory opened in Silesia in 1802, and after Napoleon took an interest in the process in 1811, 40 factories were established in France. Nonetheless, the price evidence clearly shows that sugar did become scarcer on the Continent -and it was of course this scarcity that prompted the development of sugar beet production in the first place.
None of this is particularly surprising: given the Royal Navy's dominance of the oceans, especially after Trafalgar, it makes sense that non-European goods should have become dramatically scarcer on the European Continent as a result of the Anglo-French blockades. Furthermore, it turns out that this effect was so large, quantitatively, as to dominate movements in the average terms of trade during the period. Figure 4 
Welfare costs: comparing losses in Britain, France and the United States
In order to estimate the welfare losses associated with these terms of trade shocks, it is of course necessary to commit oneself to some sort of economic model, even if only as basic a one as a partial equilibrium model of import demand. It makes sense to use some sort of a general equilibrium framework, however, since the key issue in estimating the size of the welfare costs associated with an adverse terms of trade shock will be the extent to which consumers are able to substitute away from expensive imports towards relatively cheaper domestic substitutes; and the extent to which domestic producers can shift their production away from export activities towards goods which will be consumed domestically.
As mentioned previously, Irwin (forthcoming) estimates the welfare costs of Jefferson's blockade. To this end, he uses a very simple general equilibrium model, and calculates the compensating variation change in welfare which arises when moving from free trade to an embargo situation (that is, the difference, measured at embargo prices, between the expenditure necessary to provide the embargo level of utility, and that necessary to provide the pre-embargo level of utility). As the discussion above points out, this welfare cost will depend critically on the elasticities of substitution in both consumption and production.
Irwin provides an extensive discussion of the likely magnitude of each of these, and concludes that the scope for substitution was probably quite limited, especially in consumption.
In this paper I use an equally simply model, but solve it numerically, using MPS/GE, a readily available package which has been frequently used in the past by economic historians to solve a wide variety of general equilibrium models. I use the simplest possible general equilibrium model that can generate estimates of the welfare effects of adverse terms of trade shocks, and that also takes into account the fact that all these economies had substantial non-traded goods sectors, and varied in terms of their openness to trade. In order to be able to impose terms of trade shocks, I of course require that the model incorporate both an export good and an import good. Introducing a third, non-traded good allows me to account for the fact that some countries were less exposed to trade than were others. The model is a simplified version of the well-known model suggested by Anderson and Neary (1996) with which to estimate their trade restrictiveness index; and its appeal lies in the fact that the only information needed to calibrate the model is the trade share.
All production takes place in one sector, which uses a single factor of production (call it 'value added' or VA) to produce two composite outputs, a non-traded good (NT) which is entirely consumed domestically, and an exportable good (X) which is entirely exported (see Figure 5 ). We thus have (X, NT) = f(VA)
(1)
The production function f( ) in equation (1) is assumed to take on a constant elasticity of transformation form, with the elasticity of transformation denoted by J.
The exportable good is exchanged on international markets for a composite imported good, M, which is entirely consumed. The exportable is taken to be the numéraire good, and trade is assumed to be balanced; thus
The key relative price in the model is then the (exogenous) relative price of the import good, p M , which is set equal to one in the benchmark equilibrium, but can be changed in order to simulate the effects of terms of trade shocks. Finally, there is one consumer in the model, who is endowed with all the value added in the economy; the consumer derives utility from their consumption of the non-traded good and the imported good, and maximises utility subject to the normal budget constraint. The problem facing the consumer is:
where p VA and p NT are the (endogenous) prices of 'value added' and the non-traded good. The utility function U( ) in equation (3) is assumed to be CES, with the constant elasticity of substitution denoted by F.
As is standard, I assume perfect competition in production: thus, corresponding to equation (1) there is a price equals cost equation that has to be satisfied in equilibrium. In addition, for each good in the model (including 'value added') there will be a demand equals supply equation; and finally the consumer's budget constraint is assumed to be binding, giving rise to an income equals expenditure equation. These equations are sufficient to solve for all endogenous variables in the model; and are generated automatically by MPS/GE once the model has been calibrated (i.e. ince particular values have been chosen for the parameters).
In order to calibrate the model, let the export share of GDP (equal to the import share by assumption) equal t, and assume that the country's endowment of value added equals 100 (the number chosen here is of course irrelevant to the results). Then the production of the non-traded good will equal (1-t)*100; the production of the exportable will equal t*100; and imports will equal t*100. Consumption of the non-traded and imported goods will take place in the proportion (1-t) to t respectively.
The trade share is thus the key parameter in the model, and is based on historical data.
In addition, there are two elasticities in the mode whose values have to be specified: the elasticity of transformation J between the non-traded good and the exportable in production, and the elasticity of substitution F in consumption between the non-traded good and the importable. The results depend in particular on the latter elasticity: the higher is the elasticity of substitution in consumption, the easier it is for consumers to switch away from imports when wartime blockades raise their price, and the lower the resultant welfare loss. Welfare losses should also depend on the value of J, with higher values again leading to lower welfare
losses. In what follows I start by presenting results which assume the same transformation elasticity as do Anderson and Neary (that is, J = 5), while allowing F to vary. A rationale for proceeding in this fashion is that Anderson and Neary find that their results are typically very insensitive to the value used for J. I then perform a wider sensitivity analysis, by allowing J to vary over a wide range, and seeing how my results change. In the appendix, I provide the MPS/GE code required to solve the model for Britain, using base-case elasticity assumptions (F = 0.7 and J = 5); 5 all other results quoted in the paper can be generated by changing just four numbers in this input file (the terms of trade shock itself, the trade share, and the elasticities of substitution and transformation in production). Table 2 presents a range of welfare estimates for each country, for values of F ranging from 0.25 to 10 (the latter being an absolute upper bound, since typically CGE models assume elasticity values less than unity: see Irwin forthcoming). The results suggest that French welfare losses were roughly twice as high as British losses, lying in the 3-4% range for consumption elasticities of 2 and under, as opposed to British losses of 1.7-1.8% per annum. The table thus confirms the earlier impression that the blockades hit Britain much less severely than they did her main Continental rival.
The most striking result of Table 2 , however, concerns a country which had initially been neutral, namely the United States. The results suggests that per annum American welfare losses were much higher than those incurred in either France of Britain, lying in the 5-6% range for consumption elasticities of 2 and under. (Even in the unlikely case that these elasticities were as high as 10, the US welfare loss would still have amounted to almost 3% per annum.) These estimates are remarkably close to Irwin's estimate of a 5% welfare loss for the United States during the period of Jefferson's embargo; the difference is that these are average estimates calculated for the period 1807-14 as a whole, since, as the terms of trade figures suggest, wartime curtailment of trade continued to impose a cost on the American economy well after the repeal of the Embargo Act. Indeed, the terms of trade data suggest that the American welfare losses actually reached a peak in 1814, not 1808.
Welfare losses of 5 to 6% per annum over an eight year period were a substantial burden: the final two rows of Table 2 show that the cumulative welfare loss, assuming the Anderson-Neary benchmark value for F of 0.7, amounted to 36% in the United States. This was equivalent to a permanent flow loss of 1.8%. The cumulative loss is simply the discounted value, in 1807, of the annual welfare losses (given in the row headed 'F=0.7') for each of the years 1807-14; the calculation assumes a discount rate of 5%, so as to make the calculation comparable with the welfare estimates provided by Glick and Taylor (2005) , who also assume a 5% discount rate. As in the case of that article, the permanent flow loss here is simply the per annum permanent loss which would produce the same discounted cumulative loss.
To put these losses in perspective, as already mentioned Glick and Taylor estimate that the permanent flow losses associated with the trade disruption of World War I amounted to 2.74% for belligerents, and 2.09% for neutrals. Strikingly, American losses associated with the trade disruption of the Napoleonic Wars were almost as big as the latter figure; and my estimates do not even take into account any losses incurred between 1793 and 1806 inclusive.
Permanent flow losses were lower for the other countries considered here, a notable fact given that France and Britain were the two main belligerents during the conflict (they amounted to 1.12% p.a. in France and 0.6% in Britain), but they were still very substantial.
Furthermore, Table 1 suggests that welfare losses are also likely to have been high in areas under French control during the period, such as the Netherlands and Germany. 6 Moreover, it could be argued that this model will understate the welfare effects of war and blockades, since it assumes full employment, and thus excludes by assumption any costs associated with unemployment, which as Crouzet (1987) emphasizes became a problem in Britain during 1808 and 1811-12 .
Finally, Table 3 explores how changing the elasticity of transformation in production matters for welfare. As mentioned, the 'folk wisdom' emerging from the Anderson-Neary trade restrictiveness literature is that J is empirically not very important in determining the welfare costs of protection (or, in this case, of terms of trade shocks). Table 3 shows, however, that this conclusion depends to a rather large extent on the value assumed for F. As can be seen, in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility (F = 1), the welfare cost of a given terms of trade shock is completely insensitive to the value of J. The reason for this is that, in the case of Cobb-Douglas utility, a constant share of income is spent on the non-traded good. Given income, this ties down non-tradable consumption, and actual non-tradable production has to equal this amount no matter what the elasticity of transformation in production.
On the other hand, the further away from Cobb-Douglas is the utility function, the more the elasticity of transformation matters. For example, in the case of the United States, the welfare cost of the terms of trade shock is 5.1% per annum when utility is Cobb-Douglas.
For very low substitution elasticities (F = 0.25), welfare costs are higher, but now they also depend on the elasticity of transformation, ranging from 7% for low values of the elasticity (J = 0.25) to 5.8% in the case of high elasticities (J = 10). For very high substitution elasticities (F = 10), welfare costs are lower than in the Cobb-Douglas case, and range from 4.2% for low values of the elasticity (J = 0.25) to 2.4% in the case of high elasticities (J = 10).
Elasticities of transformation in production therefore matter for the results; nonetheless, it remains true that they matter less for the results than does the elasticity of substitution in consumption, as can be seen by comparing the change in welfare estimates as one moves across rows as against columns in Table 3 .
Conclusions
The trade disruption associated with the Napoleonic Wars -the Continental Blockade, the British counter-blockade of the Continent, Jefferson's Embargo, and the British blockade of the United States -had a major impact on trade flows and economic welfare. In many ways, the most striking aspect of the results presented above is that the greatest losses were suffered by a country which had initially been neutral, namely the United
States. Also notable, in the context of the cliometric literature on the subject, is that it seems highly likely that the greatest losses suffered by the United States came in 1814, as a result of the Royal Navy's blockade of its coastline, rather than as a result of its self-imposed blockade which has been the focus of much recent work. Source: see data appendix.
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Data appendix
Data sources
Trade volumes and terms of trade Britain. Imports: Imlah (1958) , United States: North (1966), pp. 221, 228-9, 233-4, 240-3 .
MPS/GE code
The code below can be used to solve the CGE model described in the text. The code is in MPS/GE 'scalar' format, as described in Rutherford (1989) . MPS/GE is now available as a GAMS sub-system, with input files typically being in 'vector' format, which is far more efficient for large models. Rutherford (1998, pp. 8-9) introduces the scalar notation in the context of a manual aimed at GAMS users. Rutherford (1999) provides an introduction to MPS/GE vector notation. As can be seen, the input code below is more or less selfexplanatory. Note that trade is here handled by means of an artificial 'production sector' which converts exports into imports at a fixed rate (the terms of trade). The code first solves for a benchmark model in which all prices and the consumer's welfare are equal to 1. It then solves for a second model, labelled 'WAR,' which is identical with the first except that I have now imposed the negative terms of trade shock on the system. I have highlighted in bold the parameters which a user would have to edit in order to change the trade share, terms of trade shock, or elasticities of substitution or transformation. 
